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The tremendous development of cloud computing and network technology makes it possible for multiple
people with limited resources to complete a large-scale computing with the help of cloud servers. In order to
protect the privacy of clients, secure multiparty computation plays an important role in the process of computing.
Recently, Clementi et al[Phys. Rev. A 96, 062317(2017)] proposed a secure multiparty computation protocol
using quantum resources. In their protocol, utilizing only linear classical computing and limited manipulation
of quantum information, a method of computing n− variable symmetric Boolean function f(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
with degree 2 is proposed, and all clients can jointly compute f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) without revealing their private
inputs with the help of a sever. They proposed an open problem: are there more simple nonlinear functions like
the one presented by them that can be used as subroutines for larger computation protocols? We will give the
answer to this question in this paper. Inspired by Clementi et al’s work, we continue to explore the quantum
realization of Boolean functions. First, we demonstrate a way to compute a class of n − variable symmetric
Boolean function fkn by using single-particle quantum state |0〉 and single-particle unitary operations Uk. Sec-
ond, we show that each n−variable symmetric Boolean function can be represented by the linear combination
of fkn(k = 0, 1, · · · , n) and each function f
k
n(2 ≤ k ≤ n) can be used to perform secure multiparty compu-
tation. Third, we propose an universal quantum implementation method for arbitrary n− variable symmetric
Boolean function f(x1, x2, · · · , xn). Finally, we demonstrate our secure multiparty computation protocol on
IBM quantum cloud platform.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the cloud environment, it is very common for a num-
ber of clients with limited resource to delegate the server to
compute a function of their inputs. If each client would rather
not reveal his input information to server and other clients, a
special cryptographic model called Secure multiparty compu-
tation(SMPC) will be considered for use. The SMPC problem
is originated from the Yao’s millionaire problem[1], and many
classical solutions[1–3] to it have been proposed.
In 1984, a quantum key distribution protocol known as
BB84[4], which is completely different from classical cryp-
tography, came into people’s vision and attracted wide at-
tention. Since then, various types of quantum cryptographic
protocols, such as quantum secret sharing(QSS)[5, 6], quan-
tum secure direct communication(QSDC)[7], quantum key
agreement(QKA)[8], quantum privacy comparison(QPC)[9],
and so on, have been proposed. Especially, quantum solutions
to SMPC problem, i.e., quantum SMPC(QSMPC) [10–14],
attracts much attention because of its widely application in
electronic voting, online auction, and multiparty data process-
ing.
Recently, Clementi et al[14] proposed a QSMPC protocol
in which a number of clients can collaborate to compute a
function without revealing their inputs. The function in their
protocol is a n − variable symmetric Boolean function with
degree 2. They proposed an open problem: are there more
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simple nonlinear functions like the one presented by them that
can be used as subroutines for larger computation protocols?
We will give the answer to this question in this paper. In-
spired by Clementi et al’s work, we focus on the case of ar-
bitrary symmetric Boolean functions. First, we give a quan-
tum implementation of a class of symmetric Boolean func-
tion fkn . Second, we show that each n− variable symmetric
Boolean function can be represented by linear combination
of fkn(k = 0, 1, · · · , n) and each function f
k
n can be used to
perform secure multiparty computation. Third, we explore
an universal quantum implementation method for arbitrary
n−variable symmetric Boolean function f(x1, x2, · · · , xn).
The remainder of our work is organized as follows. Section
II introduces a method to compute a a class of n − variable
symmetric Boolean function fkn by using single-particle quan-
tum state |0〉 and single-particle unitary operations Uk. Be-
sides, the quantum implementations of arbitrary symmetric
Boolean functions are explored in this section. In section III,
we give the description of our QSMPC protocol, i.e., each
function fkn(2 ≤ k ≤ n) can be used to perform secure mul-
tiparty computation. Section IV analyzes the security of our
protocol. In section V, a simulation of our protocol on IBM
quantum cloud platform. At last, a conclusion of this paper is
given in section VI.
II. THEORY
Our work is a further investigation of Clementi et al’s
work[14]. In their paper, they focus on computing the n −
variable Boolean function f by using the following equa-
tions:
(U †)⊕ixiUxn · · ·Ux2Ux1 |0〉 = |f〉, (1)
2and
(U †)⊕ixiV rnUxn · · ·V r2Ux2V r1Ux1 |0〉 = |r¯ ⊕ f〉, (2)
where U = Ry(
pi
2 ) = cos
pi
4 I − isin
pi
4Y be the
pi
2 rota-
tion around the y axis of the Bloch sphere, V = Ry(pi) =
cospi2 I − isin
pi
2Y be the pi rotation around the y axis, f be
the 2 − degree n − variable symmetric Boolean function
fn2 = ⊕
n−1
j=1 [xj+1 × (⊕
j
i=1xi)] = ⊕1≤i<j≤nxixj , ri ∈
{0, 1}(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) and r¯ = ⊕ni=1ri.
Define Uk = Ry(
pi
k
) (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) be the pi
k
rotation
around the y axis of the Bloch sphere, andU0 = I = Ry(0) be
the identity operation. Then we have the following important
arguments about Uk (k = 1, 2, · · · , n).
Theorem 1 Let k and h be two nonnegative integers, then
the following equation holds:
UkUh = UhUk; U
†
kUh = UhU
†
k . (3)
Proof. First, UkUh =Ry(
pi
k
)Ry(
pi
h
) =Ry(
pi
k
+ pi
h
) =Ry(
pi
h
+
pi
k
) = Ry(
pi
h
)Ry(
pi
k
) = UhUk.
Next, Uh = IUh = (U
†
kUk)Uh ⇒ Uh = U
†
kUhUk ⇒ UhU
†
k
= U †kUh.
Theorem 2 Let k be a nonnegative integer, xi ∈ {0, 1}
(i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
(1) The single-particle quantum state in the form of
(U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kUxnk · · ·U
x2
k U
x1
k |0〉 can be regarded as the
quantum implementation of a n− variable Boolean function
fkn , i.e.,
(U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kUxnk · · ·U
x2
k U
x1
k |0〉 = |f
k
n〉. (4)
(2) fkn is a symmetric Boolean function.
(3) deg(fkn) ≥ k.
(4) The algebraic normal form of fkn contains all monomials
with degree k.
(5) Each n− variable symmetric Boolean function can be
represented by the linear combination of fkn(k = 0, 1, · · · , n).
Proof. (1) In order to prove the proposition (1), we
only need to show that the quantum state in the form of
(U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kUxnk · · ·U
x2
k U
x1
k |0〉 is either |0〉 or |1〉.
Let wt(x1, x2, · · · , xn) =
∑
i xi = ak + b, where
wt(x1, x2, · · · , xn) be the weight of (x1, x2, · · · , xn)(i.e., the
number of ones in x1, x2, · · · , xn), a and b be two nonnega-
tive integer, and 0 ≤ b < k, then
(U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kUxnk · · ·U
x2
k U
x1
k |0〉
= (U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kU
∑
i
xi
k |0〉
= (U †k)
bUak+bk |0〉
= (Uk)
ak|0〉
= [Ry(
pi
k
)]ak|0〉
= Ry(api)|0〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉},
(5)
Hence, (U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kUxnk · · ·U
x2
k U
x1
k |0〉 can be re-
garded as the quantum implementation of a n − variable
Boolean function fkn .
(2) From equation(5), we can easily get that fkn = 1 if and
only if Ry(api)|0〉 = |1〉, if and only if a be odd. Let a
′ be a
nonnegative integer, we have
fkn =
{
0 wt(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = 2a
′k + b
1 wt(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (2a
′ + 1)k + b
.
which implies that fkn is a symmetric Boolean function.
(3) It is easy to very the fact that fkn(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = 0
for each vector (x1, x2, · · · , xn) with wt(x1, x2, · · · , xn) <
k, which implies deg(fkn) ≥ k.
(4) Owing to the fact that fkn(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = 1 for each
vector (x1, x2, · · · , xn) with wt(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = k, we get
that the algebraic normal form of fkn contains all monomials
with degree k.
(5) From (3) and (4), we can draw that f0n, f
1
n, f
2
n, · · · ,
and fnn are linearly independent, and they from a basis of
n − variable symmetric Boolean functions. Hence, each
n− variable symmetric Boolean function can be represented
by the linear combination of fkn(k = 0, 1, · · · , n).
From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we can easily get the
following equation which is the generalization of equation(2).
(U †)(
∑
i
xi) mod kV rnUxn · · ·V r1Ux1 |0〉 = |r¯ ⊕ fkn〉,
(6)
where ri ∈ {0, 1}(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) and r¯ = ⊕
n
i=1ri.
For convenience of description, we denote the vector
(x1, x2, · · · , x1) as x, the vector (r1, r2, · · · , r1) as r,
the unitary operation (U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod k Uxnk · · · U
x2
k U
x1
k
as U(n, k, x), and the unitary operation (U †)(
∑
i
xi) mod k
V rnUxnk · · · V
r2 Ux2k V
r1 Ux1k as V U(n, k, x, r) separately,
then equation(4) and equation(6) can be rewritten as follows:
U(n, k, x)|0〉 = |fkn〉 (7)
V U(n, k, x, r)|0〉 = |r¯ ⊕ fkn〉 (8)
Theorem 3 Let k and h be two nonnegative integers, then
|fnk ⊕ f
n
h 〉 = U˜(n, k, x)U˜(n, h, x)|0〉 (9)
Proof. First, let rn = rn−1 = · · · r2 = 0 and r1 = 1 in
equation (6), we get
(U †k)
(
∑
i
xi) mod kUxnk · · ·U
x2
k U
x1
k |1〉 = |f
k
n ⊕ 1〉 (10)
i.e.,
U˜(n, k, x)|1〉 = |fkn ⊕ 1〉 (11)
3Next, consider the right hand of the equation(9).
U˜(n, k, x)U˜ (n, h, x)|0〉
= U˜(n, k, x)|fhn 〉
=
{
|fkn〉 if f
h
n = 0
|fkn ⊕ 1〉 if f
h
n = 1
(From equation(10))
= |fkn ⊕ f
h
n 〉
(12)
From Theorem 2(5) and Theorem 3, we can easily get the
quantum implementation of an arbitrary symmetric Boolean
function.
Theorem 4 Let f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) be a n−variable sym-
metric Boolean function which can be presented as
f = ⊕nk=0akf
k
n (13)
then
|f〉 =
∏n
k=0[U˜(n, k, x)]
ak |0〉 (14)
III. QUANTUM SECUREMULTIPARTY COMPUTATION
PROTOCOL
In this section, we will show the QSMPC protocol by us-
ing equation (6) or equation (8) in the ideal case environment.
Let Ci (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) be n clients and each client Ci pos-
sesses a private input xi and selects a random bit ri. They
want to jointly compute the function fnk (2 ≤ k ≤ n) without
revealing their inputs with the help of a server S.
Step 1 First, each client Ci divides his private input xi into
n elements xi,1, xi,2, · · · , and xi,n (xi,j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k −
1}, j = 1, 2, · · · , n) , and the random bit ri into n elements
ri,1, ri,2, · · · , and ri,n (ri,j ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, 2, · · · , n) ,
such that
∑n
j=1 xi,j ≡ xi mod k and ⊕
n
j=1ri,j = ri. Sec-
ond, each client Ci sends xi,j and ri,j to client Cj . Third,
each client Ci computes x˜i =
∑n
j=1 xj,i mod k and r˜i =
⊕nj=1rj,i.
Step 2 First, the server S prepares a single particle in the
state |0〉 and sends it to the client C1. Second, C1 performs
the unitary operation V r1Ux1 on the received single particle
according to his private input x1 and random bit ri, and sends
the resulted single particle to the client C2 who will perform
the unitary operation V r2Ux2 on the received particle accord-
ing to his private input x2 and random bit r2. This procession
continues until all the clients have applied their unitary opera-
tions to the single particle. At this point, the single particle is
in the hands of Cn.
Step 3 First, each client Ci sends x˜i to the client Cn
through an secure authentication channel. Second, Cn cal-
culates (
∑n
i=1 x˜i) mod k . Third, Cn perform the unitary
operation (U †)(
∑
n
i=1
x˜i) mod k on the single particle, and the
resulted particle will be in the state of |fkn ⊕ r¯〉 owing to the
fact that (
∑n
i=1 x˜i) mod k = (
∑n
i=1 xi) mod k. Fourth,
Cn sends the resulted particle back to the server S . At last,
the server S will get the state |fkn ⊕ r¯〉 by measuring the re-
ceived particle, and announce fkn ⊕ r¯ to all clients.
Step 4 First, each client Ci transmits the classical bit
r˜i = ⊕
n
j=1rj,i to all other clients through an secure authenti-
cation channel. Second, each client Ci calculates ⊕
n
j=1r˜j =
⊕nj=1r˜j = r¯. At last, every client will extract the value of f
k
n
by performing the XOR operation fkn = (f
k
n ⊕ r¯)⊕ r¯.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND EFFICIENCY
COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED QSMPC PROTOCOL
A. Security Analysis
In this section, we only focus on the internal attack from the
clients or the server because internal attacks are usually more
effective than external attacks. We assume that both the clients
and the server will execute the QSMPC protocol. However,
the server S will try to get the private inputs of the clients or
the function output fkn , and each client will also try to get the
private inputs of other clients.
(1) Consider the security against the attack from the server
S . First, if the server S wants to extract the private input of
some one client, say C1, he must intercept the particle sent
from C1 to C2, and measures it in the correct measurement
basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {Uk|0〉, Uk|1〉}. However, he could not
choose the right measurement base because he knows noth-
ing about the unitary operation V r1Ux1 and the state infor-
mation of the single particle. Second, if the server S wants
to extract the function output fkn . However, he will also fail
because he knows nothing about the random classical bits
ri(i = 1, 2, · · · , n), r˜i(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) and r¯.
(2) Consider the security against the attack from the clients.
Let us discuss a very unfavorable situation, i.e., the dis-
honest clients consist of Cn who will get the information
of (
∑n
i=1 x˜i) mod k, and some other n − t − 1 clients
Ct+1, · · · , Cn−1. They will collaborate to extracts the pri-
vate inputs of C1, · · · , Ct. Apparently, they could easily
access the (
∑t
i=1 x˜i) mod k from (
∑n
i=1 x˜i) mod k and
xt+1, · · · , xn−1, xn. If t = 1 (i.e., only one client is honest),
they could extract the private input x1; or else, they cannot get
any useful information about the private inputs of the honest
clients.
B. Efficiency Comparison
In classical case, secure multi-party computation is usually
achieved by garbled circuits[15]. Similarly, quantum circuits
are usually used to perform quantum secure multi-party com-
putation and a quantum circuit consists of a number of quan-
tum gates. The efficiency evaluation usually includes three
indicators: the quantum resource, the size and the number of
quantum gates, and classical communication cost involved in
the quantum circuit.
Several quantum implementations of classical NAND gate,
which are based on either entangled GHZ state or single qubit,
4are presented in the previous work[12]. In the procession of
performing NAND gate based on single qubit, one qubit, two
single-particle unitary operations and several rounds of clas-
sical communication are involved. In the procession of per-
forming NAND gate based on single entangled GHZ state,
three qubit, Four single-particle unitary operations, and sev-
eral rounds of classical communication are involved. Besides,
their protocols guarantees no security for the inputs of the par-
ties as stated in Clementi et al’s work[14]. Quantum imple-
mentation of Boolean function and its application in QSMPC
are explored in Clementi et al’s work[14]. In their proto-
col, one qubit, n + 1 single-particle unitary operations and
one round classical communication are needed if there are n
clients are involved . Hence, their protocol is more efficient.
Our QSMPC protocol is a generalization of the work by
Clementi et al[14]. From the processions of Clementi et al’s
protocol and ours, we can know that the efficiency of the two
protocols is the same.
V. QUANTUM SIMULATION ON IBM QUANTUM CLOUD
PLATFORM
We simulates our protocol on IBM quantum cloud platform.
Here, we will design the quantum circuits to fit the ibmqx4
quantum computer. Suppose the preparation and measure-
ment of the qubit are operated by the server(i.e., q[0], q[1],
q[2], q[3] and q[4]). The private inputs of n clients and the
random classical bits selected by them can be represented as
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) and r = (r1, r2, · · · , rn). Fig.1 shows
the quantum circuits of our protocol with n = 5, n = 8, and
n = 10. The definition of the operation V U(n, k, x, r) can be
seen in equation(8). The unitary operation Uk is realized by
the quantum gate U3(
pi
k
, 0, 0), the unitary operation V is real-
ized by the quantum gate U3(pi, 0, 0) and the unitary operation
I is realized by the quantum gate id instead of U3(0, 0, 0) in
the IBM quantum cloud platform.
Case 1: n = 5. let C1, C2, · · · , and C5 be the five
clients. They will collaborate to compute the function f25 ,
f35 , and f
4
5 with x = (x1, x2, · · · , x5) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1),
r = (r1, r2, · · · , r5) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0), (
∑5
i xi) mod 2 =
1, (
∑5
i xi) mod 3 = 0, (
∑5
i xi) mod 4 = 3 and r¯ =
⊕5i=1ri = 0. The quantum implementation of f
k
5 (k =
2, 3, 4) can be seen in Fig.1(a). Here, V U(5, 2, x, r) =
(U †)(
∑
i
xi) mod 2 V r5Ux52 V
r5Ux52 V
r4Ux42 V
r3Ux32 V
r2
Ux22 V
r1 Ux12 = U
†
2 V
0U12 V
1U02 V
0U02 V
0U12 V
1U12 = U
†
2
IU2 V I II IU2 V U2. Similarly, V U(5, 3, x, r) = (U
†
3 )
0 IU3
V I II IU3 V U3 and V U(5, 4, x, r) = (U
†
4 )
3 IU4 V I II IU4
V U4. The measurement results can be seen in Fig.2, and the
probabilities of output fk5 (k = 2, 3, 4) correctly can be seen
in TableI.
Case 2: n = 8. let C1, C2, · · · , and C8 be the eight clients.
They will collaborate to compute the function f28 , f
3
8 , f
4
8 , f
5
8 ,
and f68 with x = (x1, x2, · · · , x8) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0), r =
(r1, r2, · · · , r8) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0), (
∑8
i xi) mod 2 =
1, (
∑8
i xi) mod 3 = 2, (
∑8
i xi) mod 4 = 1, (
∑8
i xi)
mod 5 = 0, (
∑8
i xi) mod 6 = 5 and r¯ = ⊕
8
i=1ri = 0.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Quantum implementation of our protocol with
n = 5, n = 8, and n = 10. (a) The quantum circuit will output (f45
, f35 , f
2
5 ) by measuring q[2], q[1] and q[0]. (b) The quantum circuit
will output (f68 , f
5
8 , f
4
8 , f
3
8 , f
2
8 ) by measuring q[4], q[3], q[2], q[1]
and q[0]. (c) The quantum circuit will output (f610 , f
5
10, f
4
10, f
3
10,
f210) by measuring q[4], q[3], q[2], q[1] and q[0].
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Measurement results (f45 , f
3
5 , f
2
5 ): (0, 0, 0)
occured 12 times, (0, 0, 1) occured 82 times, · · · , (1, 1, 1) occured
88 times and a total of 1024 times.
5TABLE I. Statistics of output fk5 correctly
Boolean function Correct value times Probability
f25 1 879 85.84%
f35 1 915 89.36%
f45 0 904 88.28%
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Measurement results (f68 ⊕ 1, f
5
8 ⊕ 1,f
4
8 ⊕
1,f38 ⊕ 1,f
2
8 ⊕ 1,): (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) occured 7 times, (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) oc-
cured 1 times, · · · , (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) occured 2 times and a total of 1024
times. Besides, the results (1, 0, 0, 0, 1),(1, 0, 0, 1, 1),(1, 0, 1, 0, 1),
(1, 0, 1, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) did not appear.
The quantum implementation of fk8 (k = 2, 3, 4, 6, 6) can be
seen in Fig.1(b). Here, V U(8, 2, x, r) = U †2 II IU2 V I IU2
IU2 V U2 V I V U2, V U(8, 3, x, r) = (U
†
3 )
2 II IU3 V I IU3
IU3 V U3 V I V U3, V U(8, 4, x, r) = U
†
4 II IU4 V I IU4 IU4
V U4 V I V U4, V U(8, 5, x, r) = (U
†
5 )
0 II IU5 V I IU5 IU5
V U5 V I V U5, and V U(8, 6, x, r) = (U
†
6 )
5 II IU6 V I IU6
IU6 V U6 V I V U6. The measurement results (f
2
8 ⊕ r¯, f
3
8 ⊕ r¯,
f48 ⊕ r¯, f
5
8 ⊕ r¯, f
6
8 ⊕ r¯)= (f
2
8 , f
3
8 , f
4
8 , f
5
8 , f
6
8 ) can be seen
in Fig.3, and the probabilities of output fk8 (k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
correctly can be seen in TableII.
Case 3: n = 10. let C1, C2, · · · , and C10 be the
eight clients. They will collaborate to compute the func-
tion f210, f
3
10, f
4
10, f
5
10, and f
6
10 with x = (x1, x2, · · · , x10)
= (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), r = (r1, r2, · · · , r10) =
TABLE II. Statistics of output fk8 correctly
Boolean function Correct value times Probability
f28 0 969 94.63%
f38 1 855 83.50%
f48 1 869 84.86%
f58 1 936 91.41%
f68 0 913 89.16%
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Measurement results (f610 ⊕ 1, f
5
10 ⊕ 1,f
4
10 ⊕
1,f310 ⊕ 1,f
2
10 ⊕ 1,): (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) occured 24 times, (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
occured 124 times, · · · , (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) occured 4 times and a total
of 1024 times. Besides, the results (0, 0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) and
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0) did not appear.
TABLE III. Statistics of output fk10 correctly
Boolean function Correct value times Probability
f210 0 880 85.94%
f310 1 923 90.14%
f410 1 897 87.60%
f510 1 843 82.32%
f610 0 808 78.91%
(1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), (
∑10
i xi) mod 2 = 1, (
∑10
i xi)
mod 3 = 2, (
∑10
i xi) mod 4 = 1, (
∑10
i xi) mod 5 = 0,
(
∑10
i xi) mod 6 = 5 and r¯ = ⊕
10
i=1ri = 1. The quan-
tum implementation of fk10(k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) can be seen in
Fig.1(c). Here, V U(10, 2, x, r) =U †2 II V U2 II V U2 II IU2
V I V U2 II V U2, V U(10, 3, x, r) = (U
†
3 )
2 II V U3 II V U3
II IU3 V I V U3 II V U3, V U(10, 4, x, r) = U
†
4 II V U4 II
V U4 II IU4 V I V U4 II V U4, V U(10, 5, x, r) = (U
†
5 )
0 II
V U5 II V U5 II IU5 V I V U5 II V U5, and V U(10, 6, x, r)
= (U †6 )
5 II V U6 II V U6 II IU6 V I V U6 II V U6. The mea-
surement results (f610⊕ r¯, f
5
10⊕ r¯, f
4
10⊕ r¯, f
3
10⊕ r¯, f
2
10⊕ r¯)=
(f610⊕1, f
5
10⊕1, f
4
10⊕1, f
3
10⊕1, f
2
10⊕1) can be seen in Fig.4,
and the probabilities of output fk8 (k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) correctly
can be seen in TableII.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we solves an open problem proposed by
Clementi et al[14]. Inspired by Clementi et al’s work, we
explore the quantum realization of symmetric Boolean func-
tions and demonstrate that a class of n− variable symmetric
Boolean functions fkn can be implemented by quantum cir-
cuits. Besides, each function fkn(2 ≤ k ≤ n) can be used to
6perform secure multiparty computation and each n−variable
symmetric Boolean function can be represented by the lin-
ear combination of fkn(k = 0, 1, · · · , n). Also, we propose
an universal quantum implementation method for arbitrary
n−variable symmetric Boolean function f(x1, x2, · · · , xn).
At last, we demonstrate our secure multiparty computation
protocol on IBM quantum cloud platform.
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